The Action of the Brücke-Mühle, 21 September 1762

Let us return to the main front along the Ohm. Here was considerable speculation as to the enemy's intentions. What was he doing? There seemed to be much regrouping. Captain Kruse, the commander of the garrison of Amöneburg (a perfect observation post), reported that Swiss troops were massing in front of Schweinsberg; that Condé's troops were seen coming from Marburg and forming up near Gross Seelheim, at the foot of the western slopes of Amöneburg that guns were being brought forward. Later, another report said that gun‑positions were being dug opposite Amöneburg. Lusace was said still to be in front of Homberg. It was clear that something was in the wind, and tension mounted. On the morning of 20 September `a large camp' was reported opposite Homberg. Ferdinand rode along the line, carried out reconnaissances from various points, and that evening issued orders for an adjustment of his dispositions. It was for a simple move of each corps to its left. Wangenheim was to secure the left flank by holding the line Homberg-Dannenrod, with patrols well forward in observation. Zastrow was to take over with his right opposite Amöneburg and his left at Schweinsberg. Granby was to move to the high ground behind Kirchhain. In short, each corps was to side-step to the left. All moves were to take place after dark.

While these orders were being written by Ferdinand in person, Waldegrave reported that Lieut.-Colonel Clarke, commanding the post at Kirchhain, `had seen considerable bodies of the enemy marching and counter-marching in the plain between Gross and Klein Seelheim … chiefly infantry dressed in blue. …Three or four cannon-shots have been fired from Amöneburg; he did not know what at…'.

Night fell. The various corps moved into their new positions, having first been relieved by the corps on their right, so as to leave no gap. `Camp-colour parties' had gone ahead to mark out the lines. There, the men formed up and bivouacked. The watch along the river bank was intensified. Each bridge was guarded by an officer and a hundred men. The Brücke-Mühle (or Mill-Bridge) had special treatment. It was guarded by an officer and zoo men. They had a detachment in the mill itself, which was on a small island in midstream; and another, of one non-commissioned officer and twelve men, in an inn on the far bank, beyond the mill (Sketch XII (3)). The banks of the Ohm were watched by patrols sent out from each bridge, meeting half-way and then returning. Contact with Amöneburg was maintained by patrols from the Brücke-Mühle.

It was a cool autumn night. A thick mist rose and spread over the valley. The sentries an the bridges and in the castle of Amöneburg must have been specially watchful, for mist can cover the approach of a dawn attack and hide intruders. There were in fact intruders that night, for an officer an his way down from the castle with a report, the contents of which might have been illuminating, walked into the enemy and was taken. The castle was surrounded. French infantry were creeping forward to take up positions from which to assault. Then the picquet an the far bank was captured. This was just as it was getting light. The shouting and scuffling must have been audible to the 200 Hanoverians in the post an the near end of the bridge as they 'stood to' and peered into the mist. They occupied an old breast‑work, built the year before. Little or no work had been done to improve it. Its walls were only three feet high and gave little protection. It was overlooked from the far bank, and exposed to 'plunging fire'. Its garrison tensely awaited attack.

Then, as it lightened, came the sound of guns and the whistle of bullets. The gun-fire seemed to be directed an Amöneburg castle. What did all this mean? No attempt was made to rush the bridge despite the cover given by the fog. It was all rather baffling. By now it was about six o'clock and light. The whole army was standing ready. Those an the high ground near Kirchhain could see the castle rising above the mist as if afloat; a beautiful sight in the early autumn light. Still the guns fired at the castle.

Ferdinand came from his headquarters and joined Granby, who had left his sick-bed and taken over from Waldegrave. There they stood and wondered. At ten o'clock the mist rose, and, before them in the plain between Gross Seelheim and Amöneburg stood the greater part of the French army. There too were French infantry and guns across the bridge, in the position left by the picquet, and up along the lower slopes of Amöneburg. A general attack across the bridge seemed imminent. Zastrow brought his twelve guns into action. As he did so, the French guns opened. Three of Zastrow's guns were soon knocked out. Things were looking serious; Zastrow would need support. The whole of Granby's infantry was ordered up, followed by four Hessian battalions, and half the Hanoverian and Hessian artillery. It would be some time before they could arrive .... 

The French brought up more guns; their infantry came to within range and poured shots into the Hanoverians, only thirty yards away. They stood their ground, and returned, as far as possible, shot for shot. Each man had only fifty rounds; even at the rate of fire of those days, it was clear they would soon run out of ammunition. The remedy adoptedwas a constant relief of the post. There was, however, a distance of some 400 yards of open ground to be covered. Hourly reliefs were ordered Of 200 men each. As they crossed the open, they came under the concentrated fire of the enemy. The men had to run for it, in small groups or singly, led by their officers. It was as bad for those returning. The Hanoverians kept this up for six hours. Then Granby's men began to arrive; first the Guards, and then Beckwith's brigades. They too had to run the gauntlet, occupy their post, fire their ammunition, and be relieved. All the while the guns blazed at each other across the river at a range Of 300 yards. Such a concentration of fire, an such a narrow front, can seldom if ever have been seen. Yet, the French made little or no attempt to cross the bridge. A small party is said to have tried and to have been beaten off. The greatest danger was to the breastwork itself, the walls of which, as the hours went by, were nearly flattened. The Hessians, who relieved Beckwith's men, built their own cover by using corpses which were lying around. The dust, the smoke, the noise, the shouts and cries, and the general litter and filth of battle must have made it all seem to be even worse than it really was. The inn, with its outbuildings, and the mill itself were reduced to piles of rubble.

While all this was going on, no one apparently gave much thought to the garrison in the castle across the way. They were fighting a real battle, not just indulging in a fire-fight. The gunfire had breached the western wall. Early in the afternoon five French battalions swarmed up the dope of the conical basalt hill an which the castle stood. They were hidden from sight by a ridge stretching south from the castle. They were repulsed. Then another attack came in. It stormed through the breach, only to be met by Kruse's gallant defenders and driven out, leaving behind twenty-seven casualties and fifty-three prisoners. Finally, late in the day, a third assault was made. Kruse's men, by then, were exhausted, had run out of ammunition, and lost fifty-two killed and wounded. They asked for terms, and were given the honours of war. Amöneburg, the dominating feature of the Ohm position, was now in French hands.

That night, all was quiet. The allies bivouacked ready for the resumption of the attack. When it dawned it was seen that the French main army had withdrawn to its original lines, though remaining in possession of the far end of the bridge. No Information had come in from Kruse, who was assumed to be still there. The top of the Amöneburg was quiet. There were no signs of life. As Colonel Schlieffen, temporarily commanding Hardenbergs corps, peered through his glasses he saw a crowd of soldiers an the summit. To his astonishment he recognized them as French. It was the first that he, or any of the allies, knew of its fall. Reporting to Ferdinand he said, `I am looking through my glasses at Amöneburg and See to my astonishment that the French are there; how Ido not know, for since Your Serene Highness left, not a shot has been fired, nor has anyone known anything about it. Poor Kruse. He returned next day with his men. They had fought well. All honour to them. At first they were received by Ferdinand with some coolness. He was seldom gracious to those who surrendered. Later, he repented. He may, perhaps, have been wondering with whom the real fault lay.

It was his own fault. He had lost Amöneburg. It had not been supported. Instead of a mere twelve men in the Bridge-head there should have been a battalion or more, supported by artillery. The post of 200 men, at the near end of the Bridge, was wrongly placed, in an old emplacement, in disrepair, overlooked, and isolated. Its defence by bodies of infantry sent forward and relieved in relays, has been described as a supreme example of cold-blooded bravery; as indeed fit was; but how unnecessary! Seven hundred and forty-five men were killed or wounded in an action in which they were never seriously attacked. It was the French, not the allfies, who were an the defensive. Their plan was not to cross the Bridge, but to protect the flank of their attack an the castle. Clearly, they expected some attempt at its relief. None was made. Not a thought seems to have been spared for Kruse. One has a mental picture of a group of generals mesmerized by the local Situation, watching the slaughter and doing nothing. `The enemy neuer attempted to Cross the Bridge', wrote Granby, `The Guards, marched down to relieve the Hanoverians with the utmost Spirit and Order. All the rest did the Same...' A Counter-attack to re-establish the Bridge-head might haue succeeded. It would haue at least been a positive action. It seemed not to haue crossed Ferdinands mind.

As for the French, their capture of the castle had cost them dear. Three hundred men had been killed and 800 wounded, including Lastries whose wounds were serious, and Guerchy. How many of these were disabled during the assault an the castle, and how many during the fire‑fight an the Bridge, is not known. They made no attempt to use Amöneburg as a firm Base from which to cover an advance in strength across the river. They had had enough. They contented themselves with consolidating their position. The castle walls were repaired; guns dragged to the top, redoubts blasted out of the rock; infantry defences strengthened. On the opposite Bank the allfies did the Same.

A local armistice, by tacit consent, took place while the battlefield was cleared, the dead buried, the wounded evacuated. There was some `fraternization'. Schlieffen exchanged ideas of a strictly professional character with two of the opposing commanders. It was from them he learnt that fit was the French who had expected to haue been attacked. The troops, too, exchanged greetings. They Gould scarcely haue avoided doing so; the Bridge was so crowded. The greetings showed signs of becoming courtesies. Yet had fit come to another fight they would haue been at each other's throats.

(Reginald Savory, His Britannic Majesty’s Army in Germany during the Seven Years War (Oxford 1966). S. 416-421; Appendix XXIX)

Casualties at the Action of the Brücke-Mühle, 21 September 1762

in killed, wounded, and missing

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